an, and the glory of
God. Having involved themselves in that scheme, on what has appeared to
them conclusive evidence, they have seemed to struggle in vain to force
their way out into the clear and open light of nature. They have seemed to
torment themselves, and to confound others, in their gigantic efforts to
extricate themselves from a dark labyrinth, out of which there is
absolutely no escape. Let us see, then, if we may not refute the pretended
demonstration in favour of necessity, and thereby restore the mind to that
internal satisfaction which it so earnestly desires, and which it so
constantly seeks in a perfect unity and harmony of principle.

Section I.

The scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology.

There are three great leading faculties or attributes of the human mind;
namely, the _intelligence_, the _sensibility_, and the _will_. By means of
these we _think_, we _feel_, and we _act_. Now, the phenomena of thinking,
feeling, and acting, will be found, on examination, to possess different
characteristics; of which we must form clear and fixed conceptions, if we
would extricate the philosophy of the will from the obscurity and
confusion in which it has been so long involved. Let us proceed then to
examine them, to interrogate our consciousness in relation to them.

Suppose, for example, that an apple is placed before me. I fix my
attention upon it, and consider its form: _it is round_. This judgment, or
decision of the mind, in relation to the form of the apple, is a state of
the intelligence. It does not depend on any effort of mine, whether it
shall appear round to me or not: I could not possibly come to any other
conclusion if I would: I could as soon think it as large as the globe as
believe it to be square, or of any other form than round. Hence this
judgment, this decision, this state of the intelligence, is necessitated.
The same thing is true of all the other perceptions or states of the
intelligence. M. Cousin has truly said: "Undoubtedly different intellects,
or the same intellect at different periods of its existence, may sometimes
pass different judgments in regard to the same thing. Sometimes it may be
deceived; it will judge that which is false to be true, the good to be
bad, the beautiful to be ugly, and the reverse: but at the moment when it
judges that a proposition is true or false, an action good or bad, a form
beautiful or ugly, at that m