ted to exist in us by causes
over which we have no control; that we may be to praise for any gift
bestowed upon us by the divine power; we are constrained to believe that
he has given a false genealogy of moral goodness, and one that is utterly
inconsistent with its nature. Nor can we be made to blink this truth,
which so perfectly accords, as we have seen, with the universal sentiment
of mankind, by being reminded that moral goodness consists, not in its
origin or cause, but in its own nature. Virtue is always virtue, we freely
admit, proceed from what quarter of the universe it may; yet do we insist
that it can no more be produced in us by an extraneous agency than it can
grow up out of the earth, or drop down out of the clouds of heaven. That
which is produced in us by such an agency, be it what it may, is not our
virtue, nor is any praise therefor due to us. To mistake such effects or
passive impressions for virtue, is to mistake phantoms for things, shadows
for substances, and dreams for realities.

Section IV.

The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the reality of moral
distinctions, not because we confound natural and moral necessity, but
because it is really inconsistent therewith.

Let us then look at this matter, and see if we are really so deplorably
blinded by the ambiguity of a word, that we cannot contemplate the glory
of the scheme of moral necessity as it is in itself. The distinction
between these two things, _natural_ and _moral_ necessity, is certainly a
clear and a broad one. Let us see, then, if we may not find our way along
the line of this distinction, without that darkness and confusion by which
our judgment is supposed to be so sadly misled and perverted.

It is on all sides conceded, that natural necessity is inconsistent with
the good or ill desert of human actions. If a man were commanded, for
example, to leap over a mountain, or to lift the earth from its centre, he
would be justly excusable for the non-performance of such things, because
they lie beyond the range of his natural power. "There is here a limit to
our power," as Dr. Chalmers says, "beyond which we cannot do that which we
please to do; and there are many thousand such limits."(98) This is
natural necessity, in one of its branches. It circumscribes and binds our
natural power. It limits the external sphere beyond which the effects or
consequences of our volitions cannot be p