ve obscured the light of nature. The principal of these devices
we shall now proceed to examine.

Section III.

Of the proposition that "The essence of the virtue and vice of
dispositions of the heart and acts of the will, lies not in their cause,
but in their nature."(97)

For the sake of greater distinctness, we shall confine our attention to a
single branch of this complex proposition; namely, that the essence of
virtuous acts of the will lies not in their cause, but their nature. Our
reasoning in relation to this point, may be easily applied to the other
branches of the proposition.

We admit, then, that the essence of a virtuous act lies in its nature. If
this means that the nature of a virtuous act lies in its nature, or its
essence lies in its essence, it is certainly true; and even if the author
attached different ideas to the terms _essence_ and _nature_, we do not
care to search out his meaning; as we may very safely admit his
proposition, whatever may be its signification. We are told by the editor,
that the whole proposition is very important on account of "the negative
part," namely, that "the essence of virtue and vice lies not in their
_cause_." We are also willing to admit, that the essence of everything
lies in its own nature, _and not in its cause_. But why is this
proposition brought forward? What purpose is it designed to serve in the
philosophy of the author?

This question is easily answered. He contends that true virtue may be, and
is, necessitated to exist by powers and causes over which we have no
control. If we raise our eyes to such a source of virtue, its intrinsic
lustre and beauty seem to fade from our view. The author, indeed,
endeavours to explain why it is, that the scheme of necessity seems to be
inconsistent with the nature of true virtue. The main reason is, says he,
because we imagine that the essence of virtue and vice consists, not in
their nature, but in their origin and cause. Hence this persuasion not to
busy ourselves about the origin or cause of virtue and vice, but to
estimate them according to their nature.

We are fully persuaded. If any can be found who will assert "that the
virtuousness of the dispositions or acts of the will, consists not in the
nature of these dispositions or acts of the will, but wholly in the origin
or cause of them," we must deliver them up to the tender mercies of
President Edwards. Or if any shall talk s