of us; and when, at the last day, all
nations, and kindreds, and tongues, shall stand before the throne of
heaven, we shall be judged, not according to the feelings we have
experienced, but according to the deeds done in the body. Hence, the
doctrine which makes true virtue or moral goodness consist in the
spontaneous and irresistible feelings of the heart, "stands in direct and
palpable opposition to the authority of God's word."
Feeling is one thing; obedience is another. This counterfeit virtue or
moral goodness, which begins and terminates in feeling, is far more common
than true virtue or holiness. Who can reflect, for instance, on the
infinite goodness of God, without an emotion or feeling of love? That man
must indeed be uncommonly hard-hearted and sullen, who can walk out on a
fine day and behold the wonderful exhibitions of divine goodness on all
sides around him, without being warmed into a feeling of admiration and
love. When all nature is music to the ear and beauty to the eye, it
requires nothing more than a freedom from the darker stains and clouds of
guilt within, to lead a sympathizing heart to the sunshine of external
nature, as it seems to rejoice in the smile of Infinite Beneficence. The
heart may swell with rapture as it looks abroad on a happy universe,
replenished with so many evidences of the divine goodness; nay, the story
of a Saviour's love, set forth in eloquent and touching language, may draw
tears from our eyes, and the soul may rise in gratitude to the Author of
such boundless compassion; and yet, after all, we may be mere
sentimentalists in religion, whose wills and whose lives are in direct
opposition to all laws, both human and divine. Infidelity itself, in such
moments of deep but transitory feeling, may exclaim with an emotion known
but to few Christian minds, "Socrates died like a philosopher, but Jesus
Christ like a God," and its iron nature still retain "the unconquerable
will."
We may now safely conclude, we think, that the mists raised by the
philosophy and logic of Edwards have not been able to obscure the lustre
of the simple truth, that true virtue or holiness cannot be produced in us
by external necessitating causes. Whatsoever is thus produced in us, we
say, cannot be our virtue, nor can we deserve any praise for its
existence. This seems to be a clear dictate of the reason of man; and it
would so seem, we have no doubt, to all men, but for certain devices which
to some ha
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