e. Neither the possession of the intellect by which
he perceived the beauty of the fruit, nor of the sensibility in which it
excited so many pleasurable emotions, was the sin of Adam. They were given
to him by the Author of every good and perfect gift. _His will was free._
It was not necessitated to act by his desires. But yet, in direct
opposition to the known will of God, he put forth an act of his own free
mind, his own unnecessitated will, and plucked the forbidden fruit to
gratify his desires. This was his sin--this voluntary transgression of the
known will of God. On the other hand, if he had resisted the temptation,
and instead of voluntarily gratifying his appetite and desire, had
preserved his allegiance to God by acting in conformity with his will,
this would have been his virtue. He would have acted in conformity with
the rule of duty, and thereby gratified a _feeling_ of love to God,
instead of the lower feelings of his nature.

Thus, by observing the distinction between the will and the sensitive part
of our nature, we may easily see how either holiness or sin might have
arisen in the bosom of the first man, though he had neither a holy nor a
sinful principle planted in his nature by the hand of the Creator. We may
easily see that he had all the powers requisite to moral agency, and that
he was really capable of either a holy or a sinful act, without any
antecedent principle of holiness or sin in his nature.

We have now said enough, we think, to show the fallacy of Edwards's first
great argument in favour of a necessary holiness. We have seen, that we
need not suppose the existence of a virtuous principle in the first man,
in order to account for his first virtuous act, or to render virtue
possible. We might point out many other errors and inconsistencies in
which that argument is involved; but to avoid, as far as possible,
becoming prolix and tiresome, we shall proceed to consider his second
argument in favour of a necessary or concreated holiness.

His second argument is this: "Human nature must have been created with
some dispositions--a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable,
and to be averse to others as odious and disagreeable; otherwise it must
be without any such thing as inclination or will; perfectly indifferent,
without preference, without choice, or aversion, towards anything as
agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions at
all, they must be either righ