the nature of man by the finger of God, it
could never have found its way into the world. To give this argument in
his own words, he says: "It is agreeable to the sense of men in all
nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is
virtuous, but that the good choice itself, from whence that effect
proceeds, is so; yea, also, the antecedent good disposition, temper, or
affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous.
This is the general notion--not that principles derive their goodness from
actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence
they proceed; so that the act of choosing what is good is no further
virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition
of mind; which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before
a virtuous act of choice; and that, therefore, it is not necessary there
should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any
virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a
good disposition of heart, what is the character of that choice? There
can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which
proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or
some animal appetites; therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before
a good act of choice, as a tree may be before its fruit, and the fountain
before the stream which proceeds from it."(89) Thus, he argues, if there
must be choice before a good disposition, or virtue, according to our
doctrine, then virtue could not arise at all, or find its way into the
world. For all men concede, says he, that every virtuous choice, or act,
must proceed from a virtuous disposition; and if this must also proceed
from a virtuous act, it is plain there could be no such thing as virtue or
moral goodness at all. The scheme which teaches that the act must precede
the principle, and the principle the act, reduces the very existence of
virtue to a plain impossibility. He shows virtue to be possible, and
escapes the difficulty, by referring it to the creative energy of the
Divine Being, by which the principle of virtue, he contends, was planted
in the mind of the first man.

This argument is plausible; but it will not bear a close examination. It
might be made to give way, in various directions, before an analysis of
the principle on which it is constructed; but we intend to demolish it by
easier