his creatures, which he does not, in all cases, wish them to
obey. On the contrary, he prefers that some of them should violate his
holy law; and not only so, but he adopts certain and infallible means to
lead them to violate and trample it under foot. It is admitted by Edwards,
that in this sense God really possesses two wills; but he still denies
that this shows any inconsistency in the nature of God.

Edwards says, that the will of God does not oppose sin in the same sense
in which it prefers sin, and that, therefore, there is no inconsistency in
the case. But let us not deceive ourselves by words. Is it true, that sin
is opposed by what is called the revealed will of God, by his command; and
yet that it is, all things considered, chosen by his secret and working
will? He commands one thing, and yet works to bring another to pass! He
prohibits all sin, under the awful penalty of eternal death, and yet
secretly arranges and plans things in such a manner as to secure the
commission of it!

We have already seen one of these defences. God "hates sin as it is in
itself;" and hence he prohibits it by his command. "Yet it may be his will
it should come to pass, considering all its consequences;" and hence his
secret will is bent on bringing it into existence. There is no
inconsistency here, says Edwards, because the divine will relates to two
different objects; namely, to "sin considered simply as sin," and to "sin
considered in all its consequences." We do not care whether the two
propositions contradict each other or not; it is abundantly evident, as we
have seen, that it makes God choose that which he hates, even sin itself,
as the means of good. It makes the end sanctify the means, even in the eye
of the holy God. This doctrine we utterly reject and infinitely abhor. We
had rather have "our sight, hearing, and motive power, and what not
besides, disputed, and even torn away from us, than suffer ourselves to be
disputed into a belief," that the holy God can choose moral evil as a
means of good. We had rather believe all the fables in the Talmud and the
Koran, than that the ever-blessed God should, by his providence and his
power, plunge his feeble creatures into sin, and then punish them with
everlasting torments for their transgression. We know of nothing in the
Pantheism of Spinoza, or in the atheism of Hobbes, more revolting than
this hideous dogma.

The great metaphysician of New-England has made a still further at