ven."[447] He then
enters upon a review of the proceedings of Congress which attended the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, and concludes that "Congress has
expressed its will to withhold this power [of seizure] from the
President as though it had said so in so many words."[448]

Justice Douglas's contribution consists in the argument that: "The
branch of government that has the power to pay compensation for a
seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure or make lawful one
that the President has effected. That seems to me to be the necessary
result of the condemnation provision in the Fifth Amendment."[449] This
contention overlooks such cases as Mitchell _v._ Harmony;[450] United
States _v._ Russell;[451] Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. _v._
United States;[452] and United States _v._ Pewee Coal Co.;[453] in all
of which a right of compensation was recognized to exist in consequence
of damage to property which resulted from acts stemming ultimately from
constitutional powers of the President. In United States _v._ Pink,[454]
Justice Douglas quotes with approval the following words from the
Federalist,[455] "all constitutional acts of power, whether in the
executive or in the judicial branch, have as much validity and
obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature." If this is so as
to treaty obligations, then all the more must it be true of obligations
which are based directly on the Constitution.[456]

Justice Jackson's opinion contains little that is of direct pertinence
to the constitutional issue. Important, however, is his contention,
which, seems to align him with Justice Frankfurter, that Congress had
"not left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it
by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure"; from which
he concludes that "* * * we can sustain the President only by holding
that seizure of such strike-bound industries is within his domain and
beyond control by Congress."[457] The opinion concludes: "In view of the
ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can grant and has
granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this crisis,
I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should affirm
possession of them without statute. Such power either has no beginning
or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I
am not alarmed that it would plunge us straightway into dictatorship,
but it is at least a step in that wro