hich we must add
examples for the sake of clearness.

When we say God, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance
that is supersubstantial. When we say of Him, "He is just," we mention a
quality, not an accidental quality--rather a substantial and, in fact, a
supersubstantial quality.[20] For God is not one thing because He is,
and another thing because He is just; with Him to be just and to be God
are one and the same. So when we say, "He is great or the greatest," we
seem to predicate quantity, but it is a quantity similar to this
substance which we have declared to be supersubstantial; for with Him to
be great and to be God are all one. Again, concerning His Form, we have
already shown that He is Form, and truly One without Plurality. The
categories we have mentioned are such that they give to the thing to
which they are applied the character which they express; in created
things they express divided being, in God, conjoined and united being--
in the following manner. When we name a substance, as man or God, it
seems as though that of which the predication is made were substance
itself, as man or God is substance. But there is a difference: since a
man is not simply and entirely man, and in virtue of this he is not
substance. For what man is he owes to other things which are not man.
But God is simply and entirely God, for He is nothing else than what He
is, and therefore is, through simple existence, God. Again we apply
just, a quality, as though it were that of which it is predicated; that
is, if we say "a just man or just God," we assert that man or God is
just. But there is a difference, for man is one thing, and a just man is
another thing. But God is justice itself. So a man or God is said to be
great, and it would appear that man is substantially great or that God
is substantially great. But man is merely great; God is greatness.

The remaining categories are not predicable of God nor yet of created
things.[21] For place is predicated of man or of God--a man is in the
market-place; God is everywhere--but in neither case is the predicate
identical with the object of predication. To say "A man is in the
market" is quite a different thing from saying "he is white or long,"
or, so to speak, encompassed and determined by some property which
enables him to be described in terms of his substance; this predicate of
place simply declares h