hat is participates in absolute Being[37] through the
fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in
something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being
through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate
in something else.
VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its
particular Being.
VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one
and the same.
IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something
outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it
seeks.
These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent
interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to
each point.
Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good. For all the learned
are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends
to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must,
however, inquire how they are good--by participation or by substance. If
by participation, they are in no wise good in themselves; for a thing
which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by
virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are
good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they
do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are
good not by participation but by substance. But those things whose
substance is good are substantially good. But they owe their actual
Being to absolute Being. Their absolute Being therefore is good;
therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being
is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist
and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good. Therefore they
are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness.
But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since
they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore
they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself.
Hence all things that are, are God--an impious assertion. Wherefore
things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does
not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that
they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they
would in no
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