rra, pondere et grauitate
deducitur. Non enim quia lectus est, deorsum cadit, sed quia terra est, id
est quia terrae contigit, ut lectus esset; unde fit ut lignum naturaliter
esse dicamus, lectum uero artificialiter. Est etiam alia significatio
naturae per quam dicimus diuersam esse naturam auri atque argenti in hoc
proprietatem rerum monstrare cupientes, quae significatio naturae
definietur hoc modo: "natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica
differentia." Cum igitur tot modis uel dicatur uel definiatur natura, tam
catholici quam Nestorius secundum ultimam definitionem duas in Christo
naturas esse constituunt; neque enim easdem in deum atque hominem
differentias conuenire.
I.
Nature, then, may be affirmed either of bodies alone or of substances
alone, that is, of corporeals or incorporeals, or of everything that is
in any way capable of affirmation. Since, then, nature can be affirmed
in three ways, it must obviously be defined in three ways. For if you
choose to affirm nature of the totality of things, the definition will
be of such a kind as to include all things that are. It will accordingly
be something of this kind: "Nature belongs to those things which, since
they exist, can in some measure be apprehended by the mind." This
definition, then, includes both accidents and substances, for they all
can be apprehended by the mind. But I add "in some measure" because God
and matter cannot be apprehended by mind, be it never so whole and
perfect, but still they are apprehended in a measure through the removal
of accidents. The reason for adding the words, "since they exist," is
that the mere word "nothing" denotes something, though it does not
denote nature. For it denotes, indeed, not that anything is, but rather
non-existence; but every nature exists. And if we choose to affirm
"nature" of the totality of things, the definition will be as we have
given it above.
But if "nature" is affirmed of substances alone, we shall, since all
substances are either corporeal or incorporeal, give to nature denoting
substances a definition of the following kind: "Nature is either that
which can act or that which can be acted upon." Now the power to act and
to suffer belongs to all corporeals and the soul of corporeals; for it
both acts in the body and suffers by the body. But only to act belongs
to God and other divine substances.
Here, then, you have a further
|