[31] est _codd. inferiores; om. codd. opt._
FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME
HOW SUBSTANCES CAN BE GOOD IN VIRTUE OF THEIR EXISTENCE WITHOUT BEING
ABSOLUTE GOODS
You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure
question in my _Hebdomads_[32] concerning the manner in which
substances can be good in virtue of existence without being absolute
goods.[33] You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the
method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all. I can bear witness
with what eagerness you have already attacked the subject. But I confess
I like to expound my _Hebdomads_ to myself, and would rather bury
my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert
and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is
made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurity that
waits on brevity; for obscurity is the sure treasure-house of secret
doctrine and has the further advantage that it speaks a language
understood only of those who deserve to understand. I have therefore
followed the example of the mathematical[34] and cognate sciences and
laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that
follows.
I. A common conception is a statement generally accepted as soon as it
is made. Of these there are two kinds. One is universally intelligible;
as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the remainders are
equal." Nobody who grasps that proposition will deny it. The other kind
is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same
class of common conceptions; as "Incorporeals cannot occupy space," and
the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.
II. Being and a concrete thing[35] are different. Simple Being awaits
manifestation, but a thing is and exists[36] as soon as it has received
the form which gives it Being.
III. A concrete thing can participate in something else; but absolute
Being can in no wise participate in anything. For participation is
effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has
acquired Being.
IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute
Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.
V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different;
the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.
VI. Everything t
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