m the Prime Good which is such that of It Being and Goodness
are rightly predicated as identical. Their absolute Being therefore is
good; for thereby it resides in Him.
Thereby the problem is solved. For though things be good through the
fact that they exist, they are not like the Prime Good, for the simple
reason that their absolute Being is not good under all circumstances,
but that things can have no absolute Being unless it derive from the
Prime Being, that is, the Prime Good; their substance, therefore, is
good, and yet it is not like that from which it comes. For the Prime
Good is good through the fact that it exists, irrespective of all
conditions, for it is nothing else than good; but the second good if it
derived from any other source might be good, but could not be good
through the fact that it exists. For in that case it might possibly
participate in good, but their substantial Being, not deriving from the
Prime Good, could not have the element of good. Therefore when we have
put out of mind the Prime Good, these things, though they might be good,
would not be good through the fact that they exist, and since they could
not actually exist unless the true good had produced them, therefore
their Being is good, and yet that which springs from the substantial
Good is not like its source which produces it. And unless they had
derived from it, though they were good yet they could not be good
through the fact that they exist because they were apart from good and
not derived from good, since that very good is the Prime Good and is
substantial Being and substantial Good and essential Goodness. But we
need not say that white things are white through the fact that they
exist; for they drew their existence from the will of God, but not their
whiteness. For to be is one thing; to be white is another; and that
because He who gave them Being is good, but not white. It is therefore
in accordance with the will of the Good that they should be good through
the fact that they exist; but it is not in accordance with the will of
one who is not white that a thing have a certain property making it
white in virtue of its Being; for it was not the will of One who is
white that gave them Being. And so they are white simply because One who
was not white willed them to be white; but they are good through the
fact that they exist because One who was good willed them to be g
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