murmur, that it is time for us, Lucullus, to set
sail, and since I have already said a great deal, I must now conclude. But
hereafter, when we inquire into these subjects, we will discuss the great
disagreements between the most eminent on the subject of the obscurity of
nature, and the errors of so many philosophers who differ from one another
about good and evil so widely, that, as more than one of their theories
cannot be true, it is inevitable that many illustrious schools must fall
to the ground, rather than the theories about the false impressions of the
eyes and the other senses, and sorites, or false syllogism,--rods which the
Stoics have made to beat themselves with.

Then Lucullus replied, I am not at all sorry that we have had this
discussion; for often, when we meet again, especially in our Tusculan
villas, we can examine other questions which seem worth investigation.
Certainly, said I; but what does Catulus think? and Hortensius? I? said
Catulus. I return to my father's opinion, which he used to say was derived
from Carneades, and think that nothing can be perceived; but still I
imagine that a wise man will assent to what is not actually perceived--that
is to say, will form opinions: being, however, aware at the same time that
they are only opinions, and knowing that there is nothing which can be
comprehended and perceived. And, practising that {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} so as to take
probability for a guide in all things, I altogether assent to that other
doctrine, that nothing can be perceived. I see your meaning, said I; and I
do not very much object to it. But what is your opinion, Hortensius? He
laughed, and said, I suspend my judgment. I understand, said I; for that
is the peculiar principle of the Academy.

So, after we had finished our discourse, Catulus remained behind, and we
went down to the shore to embark in our vessels.

A TREATISE ON THE CHIEF GOOD AND EVIL.

Introduction.

The following treatise was composed by Cicero a little before the
publication of his Tusculan Disputations. It consists of a series of
Dialogues, in which the opinions of the different schools of Greek
philosophy, especially the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics, on the
Supreme Good, as the proper object or end (_finis_) of our thoughts and
actions, are investigated and compar