em by the
immortal Gods for the sake of punishment. And how is it possible that
wicked actions can ever have as much influence towards alleviating the
annoyances of life, as they must have towards increasing them from the
consciousness of our actions, and also from the punishments inflicted by
the laws and the hatred of the citizens? And yet, in some people, there is
no moderation in their passion for money and for honour and for command,
or in their lusts and greediness and other desires, which acquisitions,
however wickedly made, do not at all diminish, but rather inflame, so that
it seems we ought rather to restrain such men than to think that we can
teach them better. Therefore sound wisdom invites sensible men to justice,
equity, and good faith. And unjust actions are not advantageous even to
that man who has no abilities or resources; inasmuch as he cannot easily
do what he endeavours to do, nor obtain his objects if he does succeed in
his endeavours. And the gifts of fortune and of genius are better suited
to liberality; and those who practise this virtue gain themselves
goodwill, and affection, which is the most powerful of all things to
enable a man to live with tranquillity; especially when he has absolutely
no motive at all for doing wrong.

For those desires which proceed from nature are easily satisfied without
any injustice; but those which are vain ought not to be complied with. For
they desire nothing which is really desirable; and there is more
disadvantage in the mere fact of injustice than there is advantage in what
is acquired by the injustice. Therefore a person would not be right who
should pronounce even justice intrinsically desirable for its own sake;
but because it brings the greatest amount of what is agreeable. For to be
loved and to be dear to others is agreeable because it makes life safer,
and pleasure more abundant. Therefore we think dishonesty should be
avoided, not only on account of those disadvantages which befal the
wicked, but even much more because it never permits the man in whose mind
it abides to breathe freely, and never lets him rest.

But if the praise of those identical virtues in which the discourse of all
other philosophers so especially exults, cannot find any end unless it be
directed towards pleasure, and if pleasure be the only thing which calls
and allures us to itself by its own nature; then it cannot be doubtful
that that is the highest and greatest of all goods, a