t he saw was not the greatest possible good, nor such an one that life
could be regulated by it; therefore, he also has been discarded a long
time ago, for, indeed, there has been no one who has argued against him
since Chrysippus.

XIV. Your school, then, is now the only one remaining to be combated; for
the contest with the Academicians is an uncertain one, for they affirm
nothing, and, as if they despaired of arriving at any certain knowledge,
wish to follow whatever is probable. But we have more trouble with
Epicurus, because he combines two kinds of pleasure, and because he and
his friends, and many others since, have been advocates of that opinion;
and somehow or other, the people, who, though they have the least
authority, have nevertheless the greatest power, are on his side; and,
unless we refute them, all virtue, and all reputation, and all true glory,
must be abandoned. And so, having put aside the opinions of all the rest,
there remains a contest, not between Torquatus and me, but between virtue
and pleasure; and this contest Chrysippus, a man of great acuteness and
great industry, is far from despising; and he thinks that the whole
question as to the chief good is at stake in this controversy: but I
think, if I show the reality of what is honourable, and that it is a thing
to be sought for by reason of its own intrinsic excellence, and for its
own sake, that all your arguments are at once overthrown; therefore, when
I have once established what its character is, speaking briefly, as the
time requires, I shall approach all your arguments, O Torquatus, unless my
memory fails me.

We understand, then, that to be honourable which is such that, leaving all
advantage out of the question, it can be deservedly praised by itself,
without thinking of any reward or profit derived from it. And what its
character is may be understood, not so much by the definition which I have
employed, (although that may help in some degree,) as by the common
sentiments of all men, and by the zeal and conduct of every virtuous man;
for such do many things for this sole reason, because they are becoming,
because they are right, because they are honourable, even though they do
not perceive any advantage likely to result from them: for men differ from
beasts in many other things indeed, but especially in this one particular,
that they have reason and intellect given to them by nature, and a mind,
active, vigorous, revolving many things at