ask you whether you
think that (I will not say Homer, or Archilochus, or Pindar, but) Phidias,
or Polycletus, or Zeuxis directed the whole of their skill to cause more
pleasure. Shall, then, an artist propose to himself a higher aim, with
reference to the beauty of figures, than a virtuous citizen with reference
to the nobleness of action? But what other cause can there be for such a
blunder being so widely and extensively diffused, except that he who
determines that pleasure is the chief good, deliberates not with that part
of his mind in which reason and wisdom dwell, but with his desires, that
is to say, with the most trifling portion of his mind. For I put the
question to you yourself, if there are gods, as you think that there are,
how have they the power of being happy, when they are not able to feel any
pleasure in their bodies? or if they are happy, though destitute of that
kind of pleasure, why do you refuse to recognize the possibility of a
similar exertion of intellect on the part of a wise man?

XXXV. Read, O Torquatus, the panegyrics, not of those men who have been
praised by Homer, not the encomiums passed on Cyrus, or Agesilaus, or
Aristides, or Themistocles, or Philip, or Alexander; but read the praises
of our own fellow-countrymen, of the heroes of your own family. You will
not find any one praised on the ground of having been a cunning contriver,
or procurer, of pleasure. The eulogies on their monuments signify no such
thing; like this one which is at one of our gates, "In whose favour many
nations unanimously agree that he was the noblest man of the nation." Do
we think that many nations judged of Calatinus, that he was the noblest
man of the nation, because he was the most skilful in the devising of
pleasures? Shall we, then, say that there is great hope and an excellent
disposition in those young men whom we think likely to consult their own
advantage, and to see what will be profitable to themselves? Do we not see
what a great confusion of everything would ensue? what great disorder?
Such a doctrine puts an end to all beneficence, to all gratitude, which
are the great bonds of agreement. For if you do good to any one for your
own sake, that is not to be considered a kindness, but only usury; nor
does any gratitude appear due to the man who has benefited another for his
own sake.

But if pleasure is the dominant power, it is inevitable that all the
virtues must be trampled under foot. For there are