t when these foundations had been laid by nature, certain great
increases of good were produced,--some arising from the contemplation of
more secret things, because there is a love of knowledge innate in the
mind, in which also the fondness for explaining principles and for
discussing them originates; and because man is the only animal which has
any share of shame or modesty; and because he also covets union and
society with other men, and takes pains in everything which he does or
says, that he may do nothing which is not honourable and becoming;--these
foundations being, as I have said, implanted in us by nature like so many
seeds, temperance, and modesty, and justice, and all virtue, was brought
to complete perfection.
VIII. You here, O Cato, have a sketch of the philosophers of whom I am
speaking; and, now that I have given you this, I wish to know what reason
there is why Zeno departed from their established system; and which of all
their doctrines it was that he disapproved of? Did he object to their
calling all nature a preserver of itself?--or to their saying that every
animal was naturally fond of itself, so as to wish to be safe and
uninjured in its kind?--or, as the end of all arts is to arrive at what
nature especially requires, did he think that the same principle ought to
be laid down with respect to the art of the entire life?--or, since we
consist of mind and body, did he think that these and their excellences
ought to be chosen for their own sakes?--or was he displeased with the
preeminence which is attributed by the Peripatetics to the virtue of the
mind?--or did he object to what they said about prudence, and the knowledge
of things, and the union of the human race, and temperance, and modesty,
and magnanimity, and honourableness in general? The Stoics must confess
that all these things were excellently explained by the others, and that
they gave no reason to Zeno for deserting their school. They must allege
some other excuse.
I suppose they will say that the errors of the ancients were very great,
and that he, being desirous of investigating the truth, could by no means
endure them. For what can be more perverse--what can be more intolerable,
or more stupid, than to place good health, and freedom from all pain, and
soundness of the eyes and the rest of the senses, among the goods, instead
of saying that there is no difference at all between them and their
contraries? For that all those things which
|