ssion. For I do not know what the word good is derived from; but the
word preferred I suppose means that it is preferred to other things. That
appears to me to be important." Therefore, he insisted upon it, that more
consequence was attributed to riches by Zeno, who placed them among things
preferred, than by Aristotle, who admitted that they were a good. Still he
did not say that they were a great good, but rather such an one as was to
be despised and scorned in comparison of what was right and honourable,
and never one to be greatly sought after. And altogether, he argued in
this way, about all those expressions which had been altered by Zeno, both
as to what he denied to be goods, and as to those things to which he
referred the name of evil; saying that the first received from him a more
joyful title than they did from us; and the latter a more gloomy one.

XXVII. Piso, then--a most excellent man, and, as you well know, a great
friend of yours--used to argue in this manner. And now let us make an end
of this, after we have just said a few additional words. For it would take
a long time to reply to all your assertions.

For from the same tricks with words, originate all those kingdoms, and
commands, and riches, and universal dominion which you say belong to the
wise man. You say besides, that he alone is handsome, he alone is free, he
alone is a citizen; and that everything which is the contrary of all these
things belongs to the foolish man, who is also insane, as you assert they
call these assertions {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}; we may call them marvellous. And yet what
marvel is there in them when you come nearer to them? I will just examine
the matter with you, and see what meaning you affix to each word; there
shall be no dispute between us. You say that all offences are equal. I
will not speak to you now, as I spoke on the same subject when I was
defending Lucius Murena, whom you prosecuted; then I was addressing an
unphilosophical audience; something too was to be directed to the
bystanders in court; at present, we must proceed more precisely. In what
way can all offences be called equal? Because nothing is more honourable
than what is honourable; nothing more base than what is base. Go on a
little further, for there