t appears to him to be probable? Can any, we said, approve
of anything of which he has not a thorough perception, comprehension, and
knowledge? There is, said I, no great dispute between us, Piso; for there
is no other reason why it appears to me that nothing can be perceived
except that the faculty of perceiving is defined in such a manner by the
Stoics that they affirm that nothing can be perceived except what is so
true that it cannot possibly be false. Therefore there is a dispute
between us and the Stoics, but none between us and the Peripatetics.
However, we may pass over this, for it would open the door to a long and
sufficiently bitter dispute.
It seemed to me that it was too hasty an assertion of yours that all wise
men were always happy. I know not how such a sentence escaped you; but
unless it is proved, I fear that the assertion which Theophrastus made
with respect to fortune, and pain, and bodily torture be true, with which
he did not consider that a happy life could possibly be joined, must be
true. For it is exceedingly inconsistent that the same person should be
happy, and afflicted with many misfortunes; and how these things can be
reconciled, I do not at all understand. Which assertion then, said he, is
it that you object to? Do you deny that the power of virtue is so great
that she can by herself be sufficient for happiness? or, if you admit
that, do you think it impossible that those persons who are possessed of
virtue may be happy, even if they are afflicted with some evils? I,
indeed, I replied, wish to attribute as much power as possible to virtue;
however, we may discuss at another time how great her power is; at present
the only question is, whether she has so much power as this, if anything
external to virtue is reckoned among the goods. But, said he, if you grant
to the Stoics that virtue alone, if it be present, makes life happy, you
grant it also to the Peripatetics; for those things which they do not
venture to call evils, but which they admit to be unpleasant and
inconvenient, and to be rejected, and odious to nature we call evils, but
slight, and, indeed, exceedingly trifling ones. Wherefore, if that man can
be happy who is among disagreeable things which ought to be rejected, he
also may be so who is among slight evils. And I say, O Piso, if there is
any one who in causes is used to have a clear insight into what the real
question is, you are the man: wherefore I beg of you to take notice
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