ever so wise. But Zeno
ventured to call such a man not only happy, but also rich.

To be in pain is an evil; the man who is fastened to a cross cannot be
happy. Children are a good; childlessness is an evil. One's country is a
good; exile is an evil. Health is a good; disease is an evil. Vigour of
body is a good; feebleness is an evil. Clear sight is a good; blindness is
an evil. But, though a man may be able to alleviate any single one of
these evils by consolation, how will he be able to endure them all? For,
suppose one person were blind, feeble, afflicted with grievous sickness,
banished, childless, in indigence, and put to the torture; what will you
call him, Zeno? Happy, says he. Will you call him most perfectly happy? To
be sure I will, says he, when I have taught him that happiness does not
admit of degrees any more than virtue, the mere possession of which makes
him happy. This seems to you incredible that he can call him perfectly
happy. What is your own doctrine? is that credible? For if you appeal to
the people, you will never convince them that a man in such a condition is
happy. If you appeal to prudent men, perhaps they will doubt as to one
point, namely, whether there is so much force in virtue that men endued
with that can be happy, even in Phalaris's bull; but they will not doubt
at all that the Stoic language is consistent with itself and that yours is
not.

Do you then, says he, approve of the book of Theophrastus on a happy life?
We are wandering from our subject; and that I may not be too tedious--if,
said I, Piso, those things are evils, I wholly approve of it. Do not they
then, said he, seem to you to be evils? Do you ask that? said I; whatever
answer I give you, you will find yourself in embarrassment. How so? said
he. Because, if they are evils, a man who is affected with them cannot be
happy. If they are not evils, there is an end to the whole system of the
Peripatetics. And he laughing replied, I see what you are at; you are
afraid I shall carry off your pupil. You may carry him off, said I, if he
likes to follow you; for he will still be with me if he is with you.

XXIX. Listen then, said he, O Lucius; for, as Theophrastus says, I must
direct my discourse to you,--the whole authority of philosophy consists in
making life happy; for we are all inflamed with a desire of living
happily. This, both your brother and I agree upon. Wherefore we must see
whether the system of the philosophers can