a man, that such a disaster may befal him himself. Every one hopes to be
as happy as Metellus: as if the number of the happy exceeded that of the
miserable; or as if there were any certainty in human affairs; or again,
as if there were more rational foundation for hope than fear. But should
we grant them even this, that men are by death deprived of good things,
would it follow that the dead are therefore in need of the good things of
life, and are miserable on that account? Certainly they must necessarily
say so. Can he who does not exist, be in need of anything? To be in need
of, has a melancholy sound, because it in effect amounts to this,--he had,
but he has not; he regrets, he looks back upon, he wants. Such are, I
suppose, the distresses of one who is in need of. Is he deprived of eyes?
to be blind is misery. Is he destitute of children? not to have them is
misery. These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are neither
in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when I am
speaking of the dead I am speaking of those who have no existence. But
would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want horns or wings?
Certainly not. Should it be asked, why not? the answer would be, that not
to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted you for, would not imply
a want of them, even though you were sensible that you had them not. This
argument should be pressed over and over again, after that point has once
been established, which if souls are mortal there can be no dispute
about--I mean, that the destruction of them by death is so entire, as to
remove even the least suspicion of any sense remaining. When, therefore,
this point is once well grounded and established, we must correctly define
what the term, to want, means; that there may be no mistake in the word.
To want, then, signifies this; to be without that which you would be glad
to have: for inclination for a thing is implied in the word want;
excepting when we use the word in an entirely different sense, as we do
when we say that a fever is wanting to any one. For it admits of a
different interpretation, when you are without a certain thing, and are
sensible that you are without it, but yet can easily dispense with having
it. "To want," then, is an expression which you cannot apply to the dead,
nor is the mere fact of wanting something necessarily lamentable. The
proper expression ought to be, "that they want a good," and that is an
evil.