s and seeds of the
virtues. And of these three, as there is some one thing by which nature is
originally moved to feel desire, or to repel something, and as it is
impossible that there should be anything except these three things, it
follows unavoidably that every duty, whether of avoiding or of pursuing
anything, is referred to some one of these things; so that that prudence,
which we have called the art of life, is always conversant about some one
of these three things from which it derives the beginning of the whole
life: and from that which it has pronounced to be the original cause by
which nature is excited, the principle of what is right and honourable
arises; which can agree with some one of these three divisions; so that it
is honourable to do everything for the sake of pleasure, even if you do
not obtain it; or else for the sake of avoiding pain, though you may not
be able to compass that; or else of getting some one of those things which
are according to nature. And thus it comes about that there is as much
difference between the chief good and the chief evil as there is in their
natural principles. Others again, starting from the same beginning, refer
everything either to pleasure or to freedom from pain, or else to the
attainment of those primary goods which are according to nature.
Now then that we have detailed six opinions about the chief good, these
are the chief advocates of the three last-mentioned opinions,--Aristippus,
the advocate of pleasure; Hieronymus, of freedom from pain; and Carneades,
of the enjoyment of those things which we have called the principal things
in accordance with nature (though he, indeed, was not the author of this
theory, but only its advocate, for the sake of maintaining a debate). Now,
the three former were such as might possibly be true, though only one of
them was defended, and that was vehemently maintained. For no one says,
that to do everything for the sake of pleasure, or that, even though we
obtain nothing, still the very design of acting so is of itself desirable,
and honourable, and the only good; no one ever even placed the avoidance
of pain (not even if it could be avoided) among things intrinsically
desirable; but to do everything with a view to obtain the things which are
according to nature, even though we do not succeed in obtaining them, the
Stoics do affirm to be honourable, and the only thing to be desired for
its own sake, and the only good.
VIII. These
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