to justice, are also
common to the other virtues.

For as the nature of man has been created such that it has a sort of
innate principle of society and citizenship, which the Greeks call
{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, whatever each virtue does will not be inconsistent with that
principle of common union, and that human affection and society which I
have spoken of; and justice, as she founds herself in practice on the
other virtues, will also require them, for justice cannot be maintained
except by a courageous and wise man. Honourableness itself, then, is a
thing of the same character as all this conspiracy and agreement of the
virtues which I have been speaking of; since it is either virtue itself,
or an action virtuously performed. And a life acting in harmony and
consistency with this system, and with virtue, may fairly be thought
upright and honourable, and consistent, and natural. And this union and
combination of virtues is nevertheless divided by philosophers on some
principle of their own. For though they are so joined and connected as to
be all partners with one another, and to be unable to be separated from
one another, yet each has its peculiar sphere of duty; as, for instance,
fortitude is discerned in labour and danger; temperance, in the disregard
of pleasures; prudence, in the choice of good and evil; justice, in giving
every one his due. Since, then, there is in every virtue a certain care
which turns its eyes abroad, as it were, and which is anxious about and
embraces others, the conclusion is, that friends, and brothers, and
relations, and connexions, and fellow-countrymen, and in short everybody,
since we wish the society of all mankind to be one, are to be sought after
for their own sakes. But still, of all these things and people there is
nothing of such a kind that it can be accounted the chief good. And from
this it follows, that there are found to be two kinds of goods which are
to be sought for their own sake. One kind which exists in those things in
which that chief good is brought to perfection: and they are qualities of
either the mind or body. But these things which are external, that is to
say, which are in neither mind nor body, such as friends, parents,
children, rela