arly so with the body, is placed in the
mind; so that it appears to have been a tolerably acute observation which
was made respecting the sow, that that animal had a soul given it instead
of salt to keep it from getting rotten.

XIV. But there are some beasts in which there is something resembling
virtue, such as lions, dogs, and horses; in which we see movements not of
the body only, as we do in pigs, but to a certain extent we may discern
some movements of mind. But in man the whole dominant power lies in the
mind; and the dominant power of the mind is reason: and from this proceeds
virtue, which is defined as the perfection of reason: which they think is
to be gradually developed day by day. Those things, too, which the earth
produces have a sort of gradual growth towards perfection, not very unlike
what we see in animals. Therefore we say that a vine lives, and dies; we
speak of a tree as young, or old; being in its prime, or growing old. And
it is therefore not inconsistent to speak, as in the case of animals, of
some things in plants, too, being conformable to nature, and some not: and
to say that there is a certain cultivation of them, nourishing, and
causing them to grow, which is the science and art of the farmer, which
prunes them, cuts them in, raises them, trains them, props them, so that
they may be able to extend themselves in the direction which nature points
out; in such a manner that the vines themselves, if they could speak,
would confess that they ought to be managed and protected in the way they
are. And now indeed that which protects it (that I may continue to speak
chiefly of the vine) is external to the vine: for it has but very little
power in itself to keep itself in the best possible condition, unless
cultivation is applied to it. But if sense were added to the vine, so that
it could feel desire and be moved by itself, what do you think it would
do? Would it do those things which were formerly done to it by the
vine-dresser, and of itself attend to itself? Do you not see that it would
also have the additional care of preserving its senses, and its desire for
all those things, and its limbs, if any were added to it? And so too, to
all that it had before, it will unite those things which have been added
to it since: nor will it have the same object that its dresser had, but it
will desire to live according to that nature which has been subsequently
added to it: and so its chief good will resemble t