on the will, and are more often spoken of by their proper name of
virtues; whose great excellence is attributed to the mind as a subject of
praise. Now in the former class are docility, memory, and others, nearly
all of which are called by the one name of _ingenium_, and those who
possess them are called _ingeniosi_. The other class consists of those
which are great and real virtues; which we call voluntary, such as
prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, and others of the same kind. And
this was what might be said briefly of both mind and body; and this
statement supplies a sort of sketch of what the nature of man
requires:--and from this it is evident, since we are beloved by ourselves,
and since we wish everything both in our minds and bodies to be perfect,
that those qualities are dear to us for their own sakes, and that they are
of the greatest influence towards our living well. For he to whom
self-preservation is proposed as an object, must necessarily feel an
affection for all the separate parts of himself; and a greater affection
in proportion as they are more perfect and more praiseworthy in their
separate kinds. For that kind of life is desired which is full of the
virtues of the mind and body; and in that the chief good must unavoidably
be placed, since it ought to be of such a character as to be the highest
of all desirable things. And when we have ascertained that, there ought to
be no doubt entertained, that as men are dear to themselves for their own
sake, and of their own accord, so, also, the parts of the body and mind,
and of those things which are in the motion and condition of each, are
cultivated with a deserved regard, and are sought for their own sakes. And
when this principle has been laid down, it is easy to conjecture that
those parts of us are most desirable which have the most dignity; so that
the virtue of each most excellent part which is sought for its own sake,
is also deserving of being principally sought after. And the consequence
will be, that the virtue of the mind is preferred to the virtue of the
body, and that the voluntary virtues of the mind are superior to the
involuntary; for it is the voluntary ones which are properly called
virtues, and which are much superior to the others, as being the offspring
of reason; than which there is nothing more divine in man. In truth, the
chief good of all those qualities which nature creates and maintains, and
which are either unconnected or ne