ce did he learn it?
Still, because he consulted his twin glory and dignity, he had made great
progress in virtue.
But I will compare your grandfather, Drusus, with Caius Gracchus, who was
nearly his contemporary. He healed the wounds which the other inflicted on
the republic. But there is nothing which makes men so miserable as impiety
and wickedness. Grant that all those who are unwise are miserable, as, in
fact, they are; still he is not equally miserable who consults the
interest of his country with him who wishes for its destruction.
Therefore, those men are already a great deal relieved from their vices
who have made any considerable advance towards virtue. But the men of your
school admit that advance towards virtue can be made, but yet assert that
no relief from vices takes place in consequence.
But it is worth while to consider on what arguments acute men rely for
proving this point. Those arts, say they, of which the perfection can be
increased, show that the completeness of their contraries can likewise be
increased. But no addition can be made to the perfection of virtue.
Therefore, also, vices will not be susceptible of any increase, for they
are the contraries of virtues. Shall we say, then, that things which are
doubtful are made plain by things which are evident, or that things which
are evident are obscured by things that are doubtful? But this is evident,
that different vices are greater in different people. This is doubtful,
whether any addition can be made to that which you call the chief good.
But you, while what you ought to do is to try and illustrate what is
doubtful by what is evident, endeavour to get rid of what is evident by
what is doubtful. And, therefore, you will find yourself hampered by the
same reasoning which I used just now. For if it follows that some vices
are not greater than others, because no addition can be made to that chief
good which you describe, since it is quite evident that the vices of all
men are not equal, you must change your definition of the chief good. For
we must inevitably maintain this rule, that when a consequence is false,
the premises from which the consequence proceeds cannot be true.
XXV. What, then, is the cause of these difficulties? A vain-glorious
parade in defining the chief good. For when it is positively asserted that
what is honourable is the sole good, all care for one's health, all
attention to one's estate, all regard for the government of th
|