e republic,
all regularity in transacting business, all the duties of life, in short,
are put an end to. Even that very honourableness, in which alone you
assert that everything is comprised, must be abandoned. All which
arguments are carefully urged against Ariston by Chrysippus. And from that
embarrassment it is that all those fallaciously speaking wiles, as Attius
calls them, have arisen. For because wisdom had no ground on which to rest
her foot, when all the duties were taken away, (and duties were taken away
when all power of selection and discrimination was denied; for what
choice, or what discrimination could there be when all things were so
completely equal that there was no difference whatever between them?) from
these difficulties there arose worse errors than even those of Aristo. For
his arguments were at all events simple; those of your school are full of
craft.

For suppose you were to ask Aristo whether these things, freedom from
pain, riches, and good health, appear to him to be goods? He would deny
it. What next? Suppose you ask him whether the contraries of these things
are bad? He would deny that equally. Suppose you were to ask Zeno the same
question? He would give you the same answer, word for word. Suppose
further, that we, being full of astonishment, were to ask them both how it
will be possible for us to live, if we think that it makes not the least
difference to us whether we are well or sick; whether we are free from
pain or tormented by it; whether we are able or unable to endure cold and
hunger? You will live, says Aristo, magnificently and excellently, doing
whatever seems good to you. You will never be vexed, you will never desire
anything, you will never fear anything. What will Zeno say? He says that
all these ideas are monstrous, and that it is totally impossible for any
one to live on these principles; but that there is some extravagant, some
immense difference between what is honourable and what is base; that
between other things, indeed, there is no difference at all. He will also
say--(listen to what follows, and do not laugh, if you can help it)--all
those intermediate things, between which there is no difference, are
nevertheless such that some of them are to be chosen, others rejected, and
others utterly disregarded; that is to say, that you may wish for some,
wish to avoid others, and be totally indifferent about others. But you
said just now, O Zeno, that there was no difference