body, which places the chief good, not in the whole
man, but in a part of man? And how, as they themselves admit, and as is
agreed upon by all, will it be preserved, so that that ultimate good of
nature, which is the subject of our inquiry, shall resemble every nature?
For it would resemble them, if in other natures also there were some
ultimate point of excellence. For then that would seem to be the chief
good of the Stoics. Why, then, do you hesitate to alter the principles of
nature? For why do you say that every animal, the moment that it is born,
is prone to feel love for itself, and is occupied in its own preservation?
Why do you not rather say that every animal is inclined to that which is
most excellent in itself, and is occupied in the guardianship of that one
thing, and that the other natures do nothing else but preserve that
quality which is the best in each of them? But how can it be the best, if
there is nothing at all good besides? But if the other things are to be
desired, why, then, is not that which is the chief of all desirable things
inferred from the desire of all those things, or of the most numerous and
important of them? as Phidias can either begin a statue from the
beginning, and finish it, or he can take one which has been begun by
another, and complete that.

Now wisdom is like this: for wisdom is not herself the parent of man, but
she has received him after he has been commenced by nature. And without
regard to her, she ought to complete that work of her's, as an artist
would complete a statue. What kind of man, then, is it that nature has
commenced? and what is the office and task of wisdom? What is it that
ought to be finished and completed by her? If there is nothing to be made
further in man, except some kind of motion of the mind, that is to say,
reason, then it follows, that the ultimate object is to mould the life
according to virtue. For the perfection of reason is virtue. If there is
nothing but body, then the chief goods must be good health, freedom from
pain, beauty, and so on. The question at this moment is about the chief
good of man.

XIV. Why do we hesitate, then, to inquire as to his whole nature, what has
been done? For as it is agreed by all, that the whole duty and office of
wisdom is to be occupied about the cultivation of man, some (that you may
not think that I am arguing against none but the Stoics) bring forward
opinions in which they place the chief good among things o