of the vine, to be as it has been
before. But it would prefer itself to every separate part of the vine, and
it would feel sure that nothing in the vine was better than itself. In
like manner sense, when it has been added to nature, protects it indeed,
but it also protects itself. But when reason is also added, then it is
placed in a position of such predominant power, that all those first
principles of nature are put under its guardianship. Therefore it does not
abandon the care of those things over which it is so set, that its duty is
to regulate the entire life: so that we cannot sufficiently marvel at
their inconsistency. For they assert that the natural appetite, which they
call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}, and also duty, and even virtue herself, are all protectors of
those things which are according to nature. But when they wish to arrive
at the chief good, they overleap everything, and leave us two tasks
instead of one--namely, to choose some things and desire others, instead of
including both under one head.

XV. But now you say that virtue cannot properly be established, if those
things which are external to virtue have any influence on living happily.
But the exact contrary is the case. For virtue cannot possibly be
introduced, unless everything which it chooses and which it neglects is
all referred to one general end. For if we entirely neglect ourselves, we
then fall into the vices and errors of Ariston, and shall forget the
principles which we have attributed to virtue itself. But if we do not
neglect those things, and yet do not refer them to the chief good, we
shall not be very far removed from the trivialities of Herillus. For we
shall have to adopt two different plans of conduct in life: for he makes
out that there are two chief goods unconnected with each other; but if
they were real goods, they ought to be united; but at present they are
separated, so that they never can be united. But nothing can be more
perverse than this. Therefore, the fact is exactly contrary to your
assertion: for virtue cannot possibly be established firmly, unless it
maintains those things which are the principles of nature as having an
influence on the object. For we have been looking for a virtue which
should preserve nature, not for one which should abandon it. But that of
yours, as you represent it, preserves only one part,