say that there is nothing good which is not right and honourable,
and so put an end to all the difference between other things? That would
be the case, said he, if I did put an end to it; but I deny the fact--I
leave it. How so, said I? If virtue alone,--if that thing alone which you
call honourable, right, praiseworthy, and creditable, (for it will be more
easily seen what is the character that you ascribe to it, if it be pointed
out by many words tending to the same point,)--if, I say, that is the sole
good, what else will there be for you to follow? And, on the other hand,
if nothing is evil except what is disgraceful, dishonourable, unbecoming,
wrong, flagitious, and base, (to make this also manifest by giving it many
names,) what else will there be which you can say ought to be avoided?
I will not, said he, reply to each point of your question, as you are not,
as I suspect, ignorant of what I am going to say, but seeking rather to
find something to carp at in my brief answer: I will rather, since we have
plenty of time, explain to you, unless you think it foreign to the
subject, the whole opinion of Zeno and the Stoics on the matter. Very far
from foreign to the subject, said I; indeed, your explanations will be of
great service in elucidating to me the points about which I am inquiring.
Let us try, then, said he, although this system of the Stoics has in it
something rather difficult and obscure; for, as formerly, when these
matters were discussed in the Greek language, the very names of things
appeared strange which have now become sanctioned by daily use, what do
you think will be the case when we are discussing them in Latin? Still,
said I, we must do so; for if Zeno might take the liberty when he had
discovered anything not previously common, to fix on it a name that was
likewise unprecedented, why may not Cato take the same? Nor will it be
necessary for you to render what he has said word for word, as translators
are in the habit of doing who have no command of language of their own,
whenever there is a word in more ordinary use which has the same meaning.
I indeed myself am in the habit, if I cannot manage it any other way, of
using many words to express what the Greeks have expressed in one; and yet
I think that we ought to be allowed to use a Greek word on occasions when
we cannot find a Latin one, and to employ such terms as _proegmena_ and
_apoproegmena_, just as freely as we say _ephippia_ and _acratophor
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