t say, too often call so, namely, freedom from pain; for it does not
follow, because pain is an evil, that to be free from that evil is
sufficient for living well. Ennius speaks more correctly, when he says,--

The man who feels no evil, does
Enjoy too great a good.

Let us define a happy life as consisting, not in the repelling of evil,
but in the acquisition of good; and let us seek to procure it, not by
doing nothing, whether one is feeling pleasure, as Aristippus says, or
feeling no pain, as Hieronymus insists, but by doing something, and giving
our mind to thought. And all these same things may be said against that
chief good which Carneades calls such; which he, however, brought forward,
not so much for the purpose of proving his position, as of contradicting
the Stoics, with whom he was at variance: and this good of his is such,
that, when added to virtue, it appears likely to have some authority, and
to be able to perfect a happy life in a most complete manner, and it is
this that the whole of this present discussion is about; for they who add
to virtue pleasure, which is the thing which above all others virtue
thinks of small importance, or freedom from pain, which, even if it be a
freedom from evil, is nevertheless not the chief good, make use of an
addition which is not very easily recommended to men in general, and yet I
do not understand why they do it in such a niggardly and restricted
manner: for, as if they had to bring something to add to virtue, first of
all they add things of the least possible value; afterwards they add
things one by one, instead of uniting everything which nature had approved
of as the highest goods, to pleasure. And as all these things appeared to
Aristo and to Pyrrho absolutely of no consequence at all, so that they
said that there was literally no difference whatever between being in a
most perfect state of health, and in a most terrible condition of disease,
people rightly enough have long ago given up arguing against them; for,
while they insisted upon it that everything was comprised in virtue alone,
to such a degree as to deprive it of all power of making any selection of
external circumstances, and while they gave it nothing from which it could
originate, or on which it could rely, they in reality destroyed virtue
itself, which they were professing to embrace. But Herillus, who sought to
refer everything to knowledge, saw, indeed, that there was one good, but
wha