ose people assert it to be, who profess to measure the
chief good by the standard of what is honourable. For if everything is
referred to that, and if they say that pleasure has no part in it, then he
says that they are talking idly, (these are his very words,) and do not
understand or see what real meaning ought to be conveyed under this word
honourable; for, as custom has it, he says that that alone is honourable
which is accounted glorious by common report; and that, says he, although
it is often more pleasant than some pleasures, still is sought for the
sake of pleasure. Do you not see how greatly these two parties differ? A
noble philosopher, by whom not only Greece and Italy, but all the
countries of the barbarians are influenced, says that he does not
understand what honourableness is, if it be not in pleasure, unless,
perchance, it is that thing which is praised by the common conversation of
the populace. But my opinion is, that this is often even dishonourable,
and that real honourableness is not called so from the circumstance of its
being praised by the many, but because it is such a thing that even if men
were unacquainted with it, or if they said nothing about it, it would
still be praiseworthy by reason of its own intrinsic beauty and
excellence.

And so he again, being forced to yield to the power of nature, which is
always irresistible, says in another place what you also said a little
while ago,--that a man cannot live pleasantly unless he also lives
honourably. Now then, what is the meaning of honourably? does it mean the
same as pleasantly? If so, this statement will come to this, that a man
cannot live honourably unless he lives honourably. Is it honourably
according to public report? Therefore he affirms that a man cannot live
pleasantly without he has public report in his favour. What can be more
shameful than for the life of a wise man to depend on the conversation of
fools? What is it, then, that in this place he understands by the word
honourable? Certainly nothing except what can be deservedly praised for
its own sake; for if it be praised for the sake of pleasure, then what
sort of praise, I should like to know, is that which can be sought for in
the shambles? He is not a man, while he places honourableness in such a
rank that he affirms it to be impossible to live pleasantly without it, to
think that honourable which is popular, and to affirm that one cannot live
pleasantly without popularity;