ters. No one, then, can be happy; for a happy life
is usually called so, not in some part only, but in perpetuity of time;
and, in fact, life is not said to be happy at all till it is completed and
finished. Nor is it possible for any man to be sometimes happy and
sometimes miserable; for he who thinks it possible that he may become
miserable, is certainly not happy. For, when a happy life is once
attained, it remains as long as the maker of the happy life herself,
namely, wisdom; nor does it wait till the last period of a man's
existence, as Herodotus says that Croesus was warned by Solon.

But, as you yourself were saying, Epicurus denies that length of time has
any influence on making life happy, and that no less pleasure can be felt
in a short time than would be the case if the pleasure were everlasting.
Now these statements are most inconsistent. For, when he places the chief
good in pleasure, he denies that pleasure can be greater in infinite time,
than it can in a finite and moderate period. The man who places all good
in virtue, has it in his power to say that a happy life is made so by the
perfection of virtue; for he consistently denies that time can bring any
increase to his chief good. But he who thinks that life is made happy by
pleasure, must surely be inconsistent with himself if he denies that
pleasure is increased by length of time: if so, then pain is not either.
Shall we, then, say that all pain is most miserable in proportion as it is
most lasting, and yet that duration does not make pleasure more desirable?
Why, then, is it that Epicurus always speaks of God as happy and eternal?
For, if you only take away his eternity, Jupiter is in no respect more
happy than Epicurus; for each of them is in the enjoyment of the chief
good, namely, pleasure. Oh, but Epicurus is also liable to pain. That does
not affect him at all; for he says that if he were being burnt, he would
say, "How pleasant it is." In what respect, then, is he surpassed by the
God, if he is not surpassed by him because of his eternity? For what good
has the God, except the highest degree of pleasure, and that, too,
everlasting! What, then, is the good of speaking so pompously, if one does
not speak consistently? Happiness of life is placed in pleasure of body,
(I will add of mind also, if you please, as long as that pleasure of the
mind is derived from the pleasure of the body.) What? who can secure this
pleasure to a wise man in perpetuity?