ntempt; but you will easily avoid odium and unpopularity, for precepts
on that subject are given by Epicurus. And yet you, by employing such
large revenues in purposes of liberality, even without any Pyladean
friendship, will admirably defend and protect yourself by the goodwill of
numbers. But with whom, then, is a man to share his jests, his serious
thoughts, as people say, and all his secrets and hidden wishes? With you,
above all men; but if that cannot be, why with some tolerably intimate
friend. However, grant that all these circumstances are not unreasonable;
what comparison can there be between them and the utility of such large
sums of money? You see, then, if you measure friendship by the affection
which it engenders, that nothing is more excellent; if by the advantage
that is derived from it, then you see that the closest intimacies are
surpassed by the value of a productive farm. You must therefore love me,
myself, and not my circumstances, if we are to be real friends.
XXVII. But we are getting too prolix in the most self-evident matters;
for, as it has been concluded and established that there is no room
anywhere for either virtues or friendships if everything is referred to
pleasure, there is nothing more which it is of any great importance should
be said. And yet, that I may not appear to have passed over any topic
without a reply, I will, even now, say a few words on the remainder of
your argument.
Since, then, the whole sum of philosophy is directed to ensure living
happily, and since men, from a desire of this one thing, have devoted
themselves to this study; but different people make happiness of life to
consist in different circumstances; you, for instance, place it in
pleasure; and, in the same manner you, on the other hand, make all
unhappiness to consist in pain: let us consider, in the first place, what
sort of thing this happy life of yours is. But you will grant this, I
think, that if there is really any such thing as happiness, it ought to be
wholly in the power of a wise man to secure it; for, if a happy life can
be lost, it cannot be happy. For who can feel confident that a thing will
always remain firm and enduring in his case, which is in reality fleeting
and perishable? But the man who distrusts the permanence of his good
things, must necessarily fear that some day or other, when he has lost
them, he will become miserable; and no man can be happy who is in fear
about most important mat
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