would bid him
exult in past pleasures. He traces back his feelings to things which had
never had any reference to his body. You cling to the body to the
exclusion of everything else.
XXXIII. But how can that proposition possibly be maintained which you
urge, namely, that all the pleasures and pains of the mind are connected
inseparably with the pleasures and pains of the body? Is there, then,
nothing which ever delights you, (I know whom I am addressing,) is there
nothing, O Torquatus, which ever delights you for its own sake? I say
nothing about dignity, honourableness, the beauty of virtue, which I have
mentioned before. I will put all these things aside as of less
consequence. But is there anything when you are writing, or reading a
poem, or an oration, when you are investigating the history of exploits or
countries, or anything in a statue, or picture, or pleasant place; in
sports, in hunting, or in a villa of Lucullus, (for if I were to say of
your own, you would have a loophole to escape through, saying that that
had connexion with your body,) is there any of all these things, I say,
which you can refer to your body, or do they not please you, if they
please you at all, for their own sake?
You must either be the most obstinate of men, if you persist in referring
these things, which I have just mentioned, to the body, or else you must
abandon Epicurus's whole theory of pleasure, if you admit that they have
no connexion with it.
But as for your argument, that the pleasures and pains of the mind are
greater than those of the body, because the mind is a partaker of three
times,(42) but nothing but what is present is felt by the body; how can it
possibly be allowed that a man who rejoices for my sake rejoices more than
I do myself? The pleasure of the mind originates in the pleasure of the
body, and the pleasure of the mind is greater than that of the body. The
result, then, is, that the party who congratulates the other is more
rejoiced than he whom he congratulates. But while you are trying to make
out the wise man to be happy, because he is sensible of the greatest
pleasures in his mind, and, indeed, of pleasures which are in all their
parts greater than those which he is sensible of in his body, you do not
see what really happens. For he will also feel the pains of the mind to be
in every respect greater than those of the body. And so he must
occasionally be miserable, whom you endeavour to represent as being
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