g the taste of the sturgeon with indifference; which he would not
have done if he had placed the chief good in pleasure.

IX. We must then discard pleasure, not only in order to follow what is
right, but even to be able to talk becomingly. Can we then call that the
chief good in life, which we see cannot possibly be so even in a banquet?

But how is it that this philosopher speaks of three kinds of
appetites,--some natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and
others neither natural nor necessary? In the first place, he has not made
a neat division; for out of two kinds he has made three. Now this is not
dividing, but breaking in pieces. If he had said that there are two kinds
of appetites, natural and superfluous ones, and that the natural appetites
might be also subdivided into two kinds, necessary and not necessary, he
would have been all right. And those who have learnt what he despises do
usually say so. For it is a vicious division to reckon a part as a genus.
However, let us pass over this, for he despises elegance in arguing; he
speaks confusedly. We must submit to this as long as his sentiments are
right. I do not, however, approve, and it is as much as I can do to
endure, a philosopher speaking of the necessity of setting bounds to the
desires. Is it possible to set bounds to the desires? I say that they must
be banished, eradicated by the roots. For what man is there in whom
appetites(30) dwell, who can deny that he may with propriety be called
appetitive? If so, he will be avaricious, though to a limited extent; and
an adulterer, but only in moderation; and he will be luxurious in the same
manner. Now what sort of a philosophy is that which does not bring with it
the destruction of depravity, but is content with a moderate degree of
vice? Although in this division I am altogether on his side as to the
facts, only I wish he would express himself better. Let him call these
feelings the wishes of nature; and let him keep the name of desire for
other objects, so as, when speaking of avarice, of intemperance, and of
the greatest vices, to be able to indict it as it were on a capital
charge. However, all this is said by him with a good deal of freedom, and
is often repeated; and I do not blame him, for it is becoming in so great
a philosopher, and one of such a great reputation, to defend his own
degrees fearlessly.

But still, from the fact of his often appearing to embrace that pleasure,
(I mean th