asure.

For we rejoice in the joy of our friends as much as we do in our own, and
we are equally grieved at their sorrows. Wherefore the wise man will feel
towards his friend as he does towards himself, and whatever labour he
would encounter with a view to his own pleasure, he will encounter also
for the sake of that of his friend. And all that has been said of the
virtues as to the way in which they are invariably combined with pleasure,
should also be said of friendship. For admirably does Epicurus say, in
almost these exact words: "The same science has strengthened the mind so
that it should not fear any eternal or long lasting evil, inasmuch as in
this very period of human life, it has clearly seen that the surest
bulwark against evil is that of friendship."

There are, however, some Epicureans who are rather intimidated by the
reproaches of your school, but still men of sufficient acuteness, and they
are afraid lest, if we think that friendship is only to be sought after
with a view to our own pleasure, all friendships should, as it were,
appear to be crippled. Therefore they admit that the first meetings, and
unions, and desires to establish intimacy, do arise from a desire of
pleasure; but, they say, that when progressive habit has engendered
familiarity, then such great affection is ripened, that friends are loved
by one another for their own sake, even without any idea of advantage
intermingling with such love. In truth, if we are in the habit of feeling
affection for places, and temples, and cities, and gymnasia, and the
Campus Martius, and for dogs, and horses, and sports, in consequence of
our habit of exercising ourselves, and hunting, and so on, how much more
easily and reasonably may such a feeling be produced in us by our intimacy
with men!

But some people say that there is a sort of agreement entered into by wise
men not to love their friends less than themselves; which we both imagine
to be possible, and indeed see to be often the case; and it is evident
that nothing can be found having any influence on living agreeably, which
is better suited to it than such a union. From all which considerations it
may be inferred, not only that the principle of friendship is not hindered
by our placing the chief good in pleasure, but that without such a
principle it is quite impossible that any friendship should be
established.

XXI. Wherefore, if the things which I have been saying are clearer and
plainer than