owing to some fault of his for speaking so as not
to be intelligible. And this sometimes happens in two ways, without any
blame; either if you do so on purpose, as Heraclitus did, who got the
surname of {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~},(27) because he spoke with too much obscurity about
natural philosophy; or when the obscurity of the subject itself, not of
the language, prevents what is said from being clearly understood, as is
the case in the Timaeus of Plato. But Epicurus, as I imagine, is both
willing, if it is in his power, to speak intelligibly, and is also
speaking, not of an obscure subject like the natural philosophers, nor of
one depending on precise rules, as the mathematicians are, but he is
discussing a plain and simple matter, which is a subject of common
conversation among the common people. Although you do not deny that we
understand the usual meaning of the word _voluptas_, but only what he
means by it: from which it follows, not that we do not understand what is
the meaning of that word, but that he follows his own fashion, and
neglects our usual one; for if he means the same thing that Hieronymus
does, who thinks that the chief good is to live without any annoyance, why
does he prefer using the term "pleasure" rather than freedom from pain, as
Hieronymus does, who is quite aware of the force of the words which he
employs? But, if he thinks that he ought to add, that pleasure which
consists in motion, (for this is the distinction he draws, that this
agreeable pleasure is pleasure in motion, but the pleasure of him who is
free from pain is a state of pleasure,) then why does he appear to aim at
what is impossible, namely, to make any one who knows himself--that is to
say, who has any proper comprehension of his own nature and
sensations--think freedom from pain, and pleasure, the same thing?

This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out
of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who
can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things:
first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain;
thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and
you too, I imagine, that i