self most especially, who are such a diligent investigator
of ancient instances, are in the habit of vaunting yourself and using
high-flown language, namely, the mention of brave and illustrious men, and
the extolling of their actions, as proceeding not from any regard to
advantage, but from pure principles of honour and a love of glory, is
entirely upset, when once that rule in the choice of things is established
which I mentioned just now,--namely, that pleasures are passed over for the
sake of obtaining other greater pleasures, or that pains are encountered
with a view to escape greater pains.

XI. But, however, for the present we have said enough about the
illustrious and glorious actions of celebrated men; for there will be,
hereafter, a very appropriate place for discussing the tendency of all the
virtues to procure pleasure.

But, at present, I will explain what pleasure itself is, and what its
character is; so as to do away with all the mistakes of ignorant people,
and in order that it may be clearly understood how dignified, and
temperate, and virtuous that system is, which is often accounted
voluptuous, effeminate, and delicate. For we are not at present pursuing
that pleasure alone which moves nature itself by a certain sweetness, and
which is perceived by the senses with a certain pleasurable feeling; but
we consider that the greatest of all pleasures which is felt when all pain
is removed. For since, when we are free from pain, we rejoice in that very
freedom itself, and in the absence of all annoyance,--but everything which
is a cause of our rejoicing is pleasure, just as everything that gives us
offence is pain,--accordingly, the absence of all pain is rightly
denominated pleasure. For, as when hunger and thirst are driven away by
meat and drink, the very removal of the annoyance brings with it the
attainment of pleasure, so, in every case, the removal of pain produces
the succession of pleasure. And therefore Epicurus would not admit that
there was any intermediate state between pleasure and pain; for he
insisted that that very state which seems to some people the intermediate
one, when a man is free from every sort of pain, is not only pleasure, but
the highest sort of pleasure. For whoever feels how he is affected must
inevitably be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. But
Epicurus thinks that the highest pleasure consists in an absence of all
pains; so that pleasure may afterwards be v