feeling of the
soldier is an element in the problem of war which cannot be ignored.
The general who, with such an army, would win the full measure of
success due to greatly superior numbers, must manoeuver so as to
compel the enemy to fight him on approximately equal terms, instead
of assaulting fortifications where, against modern weapons, numbers
are of little or no avail. In the days of the bayonet successful
tactics consisted in massing a superior force upon some vital point,
and breaking the enemy's line. Now it is the fire of the musket,
not the bayonet, that decides the battle. To mass troops against
the fire of a covered line is simply to devote them to destruction.
The greater the mass, the greater the loss--that is all. A large
mass has no more chance of success than a small one. That this is
absolutely true since the introduction of breech-loaders is probably
not doubted by any one; and it was very nearly true with the muzzle-
loading rifles used during our late war, as was abundantly demonstrated
on many occasions.

I have always believed that the true tactics of our late war,
whenever our force was double that of the enemy (as it sometimes
was and always should have been at all points where decisive
movements were to be made), were to throw one half the force upon
the enemy's rear, so as to compel him to attack that force or else
retreat by side roads with loss of trains and artillery. This
would doubtless have been a bold departure from the ancient tactics,
which had not yet been proved obsolete. Yet I always thought it
strange that our leading generals were unwilling to attempt it.
Had Sherman divided his army in such a way, and struck at Hood's
rear, he might have found a chance to destroy that army as well as
the railroads in Georgia.

THE DEATH OF McPHERSON BEFORE ATLANTA

The death of McPherson, on July 22, was felt by all to be an
irreparable loss, and by none more so than by General Sherman, who
manifested deep feeling when the body was brought to the Howard
House, east of Atlanta. I recollect well his remark to the effect
that the whole of the Confederacy could not atone for the sacrifice
of one such life.

My recollection of some of the incidents of that day differs in
some respects from that of General Sherman. As soon as it was
known that the Army of the Tennessee was heavily engaged I drew
out of line the larger part of my troops, leaving the