ernative," etc.

Indeed, such conclusion was extremely illogical, as was demonstrated
a few days later, when one of the other "alternatives" was adopted
with success. This successful movement was essentially the same
as that which had been previously made to dislodge the enemy from
Dalton, and that by which Sherman's army had been transferred from
New Hope Church to the railroad in front of Allatoona, as well as
that by which Atlanta was afterward captured. Hence the existence
of this "alternative" could not have been unthought of by any of
us at the time of the assault on Kenesaw.

But there was another alternative in this and similar cases, which
was much discussed at various times during the campaign. Its
practicability can be judged of only upon general principles, for
it was never tried. It was to detach two or three corps, nearly
half our army (which was about double the strength of the enemy),
make a detour wide enough to avoid his fortifications, and strike
directly at his flank and rear. Such a movement, it was urged, at
Dalton, Kenesaw, or Atlanta would have compelled Johnston to fight
a battle on equal terms with one half of Sherman's army, while he
had to hold his parapets against the other half. Whatever else
may be said of this proposed movement, it would undoubtedly have
been more hazardous and much more decisive, one way or the other,
than any of the plans actually adopted. It certainly promised
success proportionate to the cost, instead of a costly failure,
which the assault of fortified lines had almost invariably proved
to be.

I did not see Thomas or McPherson for some days before the assault,
but I believe their judgment, like mine, was opposed to it.
Undoubtedly it was generally opposed, though deferentially as became
subordinates toward the commanding general. The responsibility
was entirely Sherman's, as he afterward frankly stated; and I
presume he did not mean to imply otherwise by the language used in
his "Memoirs" above quoted (Vol. II, page 60). General Sherman's
orders, issued on June 24 (Special Field Orders, No. 28), directed
each of the three armies to make an attack (under the word "assault"
for Thomas and "attack" for McPherson and me). I had made all
preparations to carry out the order on my part. Being visited by
General Sherman a day or two before the date named for the execution
of the order (June 27), I explained to him what I had done, and
how little hope there wa