l vibratory
336
movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1].
The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence,
but is one which is similar to the effects produced by
the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When
I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch
not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the
universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also
with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The
result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called _alocanajnana_
(sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the
memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character
(_sukhasadhanatvasm@rti_) and as a result of that I perceive the
orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref
2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable
object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception
through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant
cause (sahakari). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand
the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon
understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though
this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind,
yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact,
it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and
hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive
intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact
and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is
in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process.
Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable
condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses
be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals
associated with them but also with negation. A perception is
erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does
not possess (_atasmi@mstaditi_) and right knowledge (_prama_) is that
which presents an object with a character which it really has
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:
_Na khalvatindriya s'aktirasmabhirupagamyate
yaya saha na karyyasya sambandhajnanasambhava@h.
Nyayamanjari_, p. 69.]
[Footnote 2:
_Sukhadi manasa buddhva kapitthadi ca cak@su@s
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