ing the colour
is in samavaya relation, and in the specific colour there is the
colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavaya
relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavaya
by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory
sense is akas'a and the sound exists in akas'a in the samavaya
relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar
kind of contact called samaveta-samavaya. (5) The generic
character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived
by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavaya. (6) There is
another kind of contact by which negation (_abhava_) is perceived,
namely sa@myukta vis'e@sa@na (as qualifying contact). This is so
called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is
qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.
Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in
this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug
is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along
with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen
that Nyaya admits not only the substances and qualities but all
kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly
apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).

The most important thing about the Nyaya-Vais'e@sika theory
of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the
contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception
of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its
usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception
and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and
the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact
between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge
is indeed _arthaprakas'a,_ revelation of objects, and it is called
perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its
production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with
which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with
the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not
only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with
the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well.
The senses according to Nyaya-Vais`e@sika are material and we have
seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental
(_atindriya_) power (_s'akti_) than that of actua