location which generates the knowledge as well as the nature
or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is
different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of
our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda
(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge
being different in each case, and the manner or conditions
producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be
admitted that inference and s'abda are different prama@nas, though
they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyaya
thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamana
within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production
of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different
prama@nas [Footnote ref 1].
Perception (Pratyak@sa).
The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which
they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.
These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic
of that element of which they were composed. Thus the
ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of
akas'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The
eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.
Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects
by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.
The cognitive senses (_vak, pani, pada, payu_, and _upastha_) recognized
in Sa@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such
for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the
general motor functions of the body.
Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the
contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error
not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such
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[Footnote 1:
_Samagribhedai phalabhedacca prama@nabheda@h
Anye eva hi samagriphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h
Anye eva ca samagriphale s'abdopamanayo@h. Nyayamanjari_, p. 33.]
334
as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just
at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate
[Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow,
the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be
counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (_s'abda-prama@na_).
That right knowledge which
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