by_ things, for this phrase implies a
false severance of the appearance from the things which appear. If
there are 'appearances' at all, they are appearances _of_ things and
not appearances _produced by_ them. The importance of the distinction
lies in the difference of implication. To speak of appearances
produced by things is to imply that the object of perception is merely
something mental, viz. an appearance. Consequently, access to a
non-mental reality is excluded; for a perception of which the object
is something belonging to the mind's own being cannot justify an
inference to something beyond the mind, and the result is inevitably
solipsism. On the other hand, the phrase 'appearances of things',
whatever defects it may have, at least implies that it is a non-mental
reality which appears, and therefore that in perception we are in
direct relation to it; the phrase, therefore, does not imply from the
very beginning that the apprehension of a non-mental reality is
impossible.

The objection will probably be raised that this criticism is much too
summary. We do, it will be said, distinguish in ordinary consciousness
between appearance and reality. Consequently there must be some form
in which Kant's distinction between things in themselves and phenomena
and the conclusion based upon it are justified. Moreover, Kant's
reiterated assertion that his view does not imply that space is an
illusion, and that the distinction between the real and the illusory
is possible _within_ phenomena, requires us to consider more closely
whether Kant may not after all be entitled to hold that space is not
an illusion.[8]

[8] Cf. p. 93 and ff.

This objection is, of course, reasonable. No one can satisfy himself
of the justice of the above criticisms until he has considered the
real nature of the distinction between appearance and reality. This
distinction must, therefore, be analysed. But before this is done it
is necessary, in order to discover the real issue, to formulate the
lines on which Kant may be defended. 'The reality,' it may be urged,
'which ideally we wish to know must be admitted to exist _in itself_,
in the sense of independently of the perception, and consequently its
nature must be admitted to be independent of perception. Ideally,
then, our desire is to know things[9] as they are in themselves, a
desire sufficiently expressed by the assertion that we desire to know
things, for to know them is to know them as the