ly precedes
all perceptions of these objects." These sentences identify
things in themselves and bodies in space, and thereby imply
that in empirical perception we perceive things in themselves
and as they _are_.

On the other hand, if we consider Kant's conclusion from the point of
view, not of the problem which originates it, but of the distinction
in terms of which he states it, viz. that between things as they are
in themselves and things as perceived by us, we are led to expect the
contrary result. Since perception is the being affected by things, and
since the nature of the affection depends upon the nature of our
capacity of being affected, in _all_ perception the object will become
distorted or transformed, as it were, by our capacity of being
affected. The conclusion, therefore, should be that in all judgements,
empirical as well as _a priori_, we apprehend things only as
perceived. The reason why Kant does not draw this conclusion is
probably that given above, viz. that by the time Kant reaches the
solution of his problem empirical knowledge has come to relate to
sensation only; consequently, it has ceased to occur to him that
empirical judgements could possibly give us knowledge of things as
they are. Nevertheless, Kant should not have retained in his
formulation of the problem a distinction irreconcilable with his
solution of it; and if he had realized that he was doing so he might
have been compelled to modify his whole view.

The second difficulty is more serious. If the truth of geometrical
judgements presupposes that space is only a property of objects as
perceived by us, it is a paradox that geometricians should be
convinced, as they are, of the truth of their judgements. They
undoubtedly think that their judgements apply to things as they are in
themselves, and not merely as they appear to us. They certainly do not
think that the relations which they discover apply to objects only as
perceived. Not only, therefore, do they not think that bodies in space
are phenomena, but they do not even leave it an open question whether
bodies are phenomena or not. Hence, if Kant be right, they are really
in a state of illusion, for on his view the true geometrical judgement
should include in itself the phenomenal character of spatial
relations; it should be illustrated by expressing Euclid I. 5 in
the form that the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles
triangle belongs to objects as p