uld he not perish from hunger and thirst? and if
this be granted, do we not seem to conceive him as a statue of a man or
as an ass? If I deny that he would thus perish, he will consequently
determine himself and possess the power of going where he likes and
doing what he likes.
There may be other objections besides these, but as I am not bound to
discuss what every one may dream, I shall therefore make it my business
to answer as briefly as possible those only which I have mentioned.
In reply to the first objection, I grant that the will extends itself
more widely than the intellect, if by the intellect we understand only
clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will extends itself more
widely than the perceptions or the faculty of conception; nor, indeed,
do I see why the faculty of will should be said to be infinite any more
than the faculty of feeling; for as by the same faculty of will we can
affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
affirm an infinite number of things at once), so also by the same
faculty of feeling we can feel or perceive (one after another) an
infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there are an infinite
number of things which we cannot perceive, I reply that such things as
these we can reach by no thought, and consequently by no faculty of
will. But it is said that if God wished us to perceive those things, it
would be necessary for Him to give us a larger faculty of perception,
but not a larger faculty of will than He has already given us, which is
the same thing as saying that if God wished us to understand an infinite
number of other beings, it would be necessary for Him to give us a
greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being (in order to
embrace that infinite number of beings), than He has given us. For we
have shown that the will is a Universal, or the idea by which we explain
all individual volitions, that is to say, that which is common to them
all. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that those who believe this
common or universal idea of all the volitions to be a faculty should say
that it extends itself infinitely beyond the limits of the intellect.
For the universal is predicated of one or of many, or of an infinite
number of individuals.
The second objection I answer by denying that we have free power of
suspending judgment. For when we say that a person suspends judgment, we
only say in other words that he sees that he
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