swayed by equine lust and the man by that which is human. The lusts
and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must vary in the same way;
and so, although each individual lives contented with its own nature and
delights in it, nevertheless the life with which it is contented and its
joy are nothing but the idea or soul of that individual, and so the joy
of one differs in character from the joy of the other as much as the
essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. Finally, it
follows from the preceding proposition that the joy by which the
drunkard is enslaved is altogether different from the joy which is the
portion of the philosopher,--a thing I wished just to hint in passing.
_The Inconstancy of the Emotions_
The human body is affected by external bodies in a number of ways. Two
men, therefore, may be affected in different ways at the same time, and
therefore they can be affected by one and the same object in different
ways. Again the human body may be affected now in this and now in that
way, and consequently it may be affected by one and the same object in
different ways at different times.
We thus see that it is possible for one man to love a thing and for
another man to hate it; for this man to fear what this man does not
fear, and for the same man to love what before he hated, and to dare to
do what before he feared. Again, since each judges according to his own
emotion what is good and what is evil, what is better and what is
worse, it follows that men may change in their judgment as they do in
their emotions, and hence it comes to pass that when we compare men, we
distinguish them solely by the difference in their emotions, calling
some brave, others timid, and others by other names.
For example, I shall call a man _brave_ who despises an evil which I
usually fear, and if, besides this, I consider the fact that his desire
of doing evil to a person whom he hates or doing good to one whom he
loves is not restrained by that fear of evil by which I am usually
restrained, I call him _audacious_. On the other hand, the man who fears
an evil which I usually despise will appear _timid_, and if, besides
this, I consider that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil
which has no power to restrain me, I call him _pusillanimous_; and in
this way everybody will pass judgment.
Finally, from this nature of man and the inconstancy of his judgment, in
consequence of which he often judges things
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