r, therefore, an individual, considered as under the sway of
Nature, thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or
impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to
take for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or
any other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy any one who
hinders the accomplishment of his purpose.
It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of
Nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live,
only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it
does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed,
any of the means suggested by desire.
This we need not wonder at, for Nature is not bounded by the laws of
human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation.
Her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order
of Nature, wherein man is but a speck. It is by the necessity of this
alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a
particular way. If anything, therefore, in Nature seems to us
ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are
almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of Nature as a
whole, and also because we want everything to be arranged according to
the dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers
evil is not evil in respect to the order and laws of Nature as a whole,
but only in respect to the laws of our reason.
Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live
according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said,
they have men's true good for their object. Moreover, every one wishes
to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this
would be quite impossible so long as every one did everything he liked,
and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger.
There is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred,
anger and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can.
When we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must
needs live most miserably, ... we shall plainly see that men must
necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well
as possible if they are to enjoy, as a whole, the rights which naturally
belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more
conditioned by t
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